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Abstract 
Successive reports into the construction industry have increasingly emphasised the 
importance of developing relationships based on trust between the contracting 
parties.   This has led to the development of the co-operative arrangement called 
‘partnering’ in construction contracts.  
 
There is, however, minimal industry guidance on what expectations the parties can 
have of the judicial interpretation of partnering arrangements containing references to 
relational concepts such as trust, co-operation, openness, etc where the relationship 
breaks down and parties have relied on it, perhaps to their detriment.   This 
interpretation is relevant to the allocation of commercial liabilities between the 
parties and therefore represents a commercial risk to them. 
 
This paper examines the likely current attitude of the courts in England and Scotland 
to the various forms of the relationship covered by the term ‘partnering’ in 
construction contracts.  
 
 
 2
Introduction 
 
In terms of the nature of the relationship between the parties contracts can range from 
those, such as simple exchange, which create no significant relationship between the 
parties, to those which create ongoing, highly intensive relationships relying on 
mutual trust, such as legal partnership.   Between these extremes contracts may be 
‘relational’ to varying degrees. 
 
 
Over the past twenty years there has been a development towards contract 
arrangements in construction which are more relational in nature.   Revised and new 
standard forms of contract have introduced specific duties of a relational nature by 
the use of terms such as trust, co-operation and good faith and have attempted to 
design the contract administration processes to promote these concepts1.   In 
particular ‘partnering’ arrangements have evolved.   In his report “Constructing the 
Team” Sir Michael Latham described partnering as a formal agreement where “the 
parties agree to work together, in a relationship of trust, to achieve specific primary 
objectives”2.  
 
 
By considering rules of law and judicial decisions and comment, this paper examines 
the likely current attitude of the courts in England and Scotland to the various forms 
of the relationship covered by the term ‘partnering’ in construction contracts and the 
effect that this may have on the judicial interpretation of the contract between the 
                                                     
1 Eg the NEC Engineering and Construction Contract (London: Thomas Telford Services Ltd, 
1995); GC/Works/1 with Quantities (1998) General Conditions (London: The Stationery Office, 
1998); The ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (PPC2000), drafted by Trowers 
& Hamlins in association with The Association of Consultant Architects Ltd (2000).  
2 Final report of the government/industry review of procurement and contractual arrangements in 
the U.K. construction industry by Sir Michael Latham, Constructing the Team (London: HMSO, 
1994), p.62, para.6.43. 
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parties. 
 
 
Partnering arrangements 
 
Current partnering arrangements in the construction industry generally involve one of 
the following: 
 
• a traditional standard form construction contract3 supported by a separate non-
binding partnering charter:  in this arrangement the partnering charter  expresses 
the parties’ commitments to relational concepts such as trust, co-operation 
openness, common goals, etc, whilst the standard form contract expresses the 
formal legal obligations 
 
• a binding partnering contract: in this arrangement the binding contract includes  
the relational aspects as formal obligations; a standard form of contract of this 
type has recently been published4. 
 
Eisenberg attempts to define ‘relational’ contracts.   He suggests that the best 
definition is simply that a relational contract is one which “involves not merely an 
exchange, but also a relationship, between the contracting parties”5 and he 
specifically refers to construction contracts in this context6. 
 
                                                     
3 Eg the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, the ICE Conditions of Contract, etc. 
4 The ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (PPC2000), drafted by Trowers & 
Hamlins in association with The Association of Consultant Architects Ltd (2000) 
5 Eisenberg, M, ‘Relational Contracts’ in Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel (eds), Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p.296. 
6 Ibid. p.304. 
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The relational aspects of partnering arrangements in construction contracts clearly 
exceed the basic requirement for a ‘relational contract’ as defined by Eisenberg.    
 
In “Rethinking Construction Sir John Egan suggested yet more intensive 
relationships when he advised that “(t)he industry must replace competitive tendering 
with long term relationships”7 
 
Industry guidance 
 
Egan and Latham have indicated that government and the industry want construction 
arrangements to be more intensively relational in nature.  
 
However industry guidance is vague on the legal effect of relational concepts when 
expressed in commercial contracts.   This vagueness is demonstrated by the 
Construction Industry Council (CIC)8 when they refer to the possibility of including a 
specific relational duty of ‘good faith’ in partnering contracts but advise that: 
 
 “(i)ssues in relation to good faith as an operative contractual provision 
include uncertainty, as it may be construed as being too vague to have any 
legal effect or as requiring the parties to act in good faith in all matters.  
Good faith is an uncertain concept in English law, which may or may not 
allow a party not to be in strict application of contractual provisions (eg as to 
                                                     
7 The Report of the construction industry task force chaired by Sir John Egan,  Rethinking 
Construction, (London DETR, 1998), Executive Summary, p.8. 
8 The CIC is the representative forum for the construction industry’s professional bodies, research 
organisations and specialist trade organisations. 
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extensions of time).”9. 
 
The commentary which goes with the GC/Works/110  standard form of construction 
contract is also circumspect in its advice concerning how the relational good faith 
provision in that form of contract might be interpreted as follows: 
 
A general duty is imposed on the parties to ‘deal fairly, in good faith and in 
mutual co-operation, with one another’.   All parts of the Contract must be read 
against the background of this condition.   It will not be sufficient for a party to 
apply the letter of the Contract if this would amount to sharp practice or 
obstructionism.   It would be reasonable to expect any such action to count 
against the responsible party if reviewed by adjudicators and arbitrators in the 
context of disputes dealt with under Conditions 59 (Adjudication) and 60 
(Arbitration and choice of law).”11. 
 
However, where the relationship breaks down, judicial interpretation of the 
agreement between the parties may be required.   Consequently the attitude of the law 
to the relational content of the agreement will be relevant to the resulting allocation 
of commercial liabilities between the parties. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
9 The Construction Industry Council, A Guide to Project Team Partnering (London: CIC 2000), 
p.16, explanatory note 9. 
10 The Property Advisers to the Civil Estate, (London: the Stationery Office, 1998). 
11 The Property Advisers to the Civil Estate, GC/Works/1 Model Forms and Commentary (1998), 
(London: the Stationery Office, 1998), p.70, Condition 1A. 
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Commercial contracts and self interest 
 
Partnering agreements are clearly intended to intensify the relational nature of 
construction contracts.   As previously indicated, these agreements frequently contain 
express references to general relational concepts such as trust, collaboration, 
goodwill, co-operation, good faith etc.   In some cases more detailed obligations in 
relation to ‘open book accounting’ and disclosure of information are included.12   It is 
reasonable to suggest, therefore, that parties will have some positive expectations of 
the relational aspects of partnering arrangements.   It is submitted that such 
expectations would include moderation of the extent to which each party is entitled to 
pursue their own self interest at the expense of other parties.     
   
However, in a competitive commercial context, relational concepts give rise to a 
fundamental tension between individual self interest and consideration of the interests 
of other contracting parties. 
 
The classical attitude of the courts in both England and Scotland towards self interest 
in commercial contracts was that the parties were the masters of their own contractual 
fate.   This resulted in rules which encouraged minimum judicial intervention in the 
contract terms and maximum judicial certainty of enforcement of those terms.  
Provided that there was contractual consent, the fairness of the contract terms was a 
matter for the parties themselves.   This ‘freedom of contract’ approach was generally 
                                                     
12 Eg the ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (PPC2000) drafted by Trowers & 
Hamlins in association with, and published by, The Association of Consultant Architects Ltd 
(2000), clauses 3.1, 10.3 & 23.2. 
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seen as beneficial to a mercantilist society.13 
 
Eisenberg points out that one of the central paradigms of classical contract law was 
“a contract for a homogeneous commodity concluded between two strangers 
transacting on a perfect spot market”14 which he describes as a ‘discrete’ contract as 
opposed to a ‘relational’ contract.   Consequently the classical approach was often 
suitable only for ‘discrete’ contracts. 
 
 
In the second half of the Twentieth Century modern contract law was characterised 
by some moderation of this position with the recognition of new categories of 
impaired contractual consent and some legislative intervention resulting in terms 
relating to fairness being implied into certain types of contracts (eg consumer 
contracts).    
 
 
These safeguards are not, however, for the purpose of establishing minimum 
standards of fairness in commercial contracts between businessmen.   Indeed there is 
some opinion that recently there has been a post-modern return to classical principles 
characterised by a return towards the values of certainty.15   Chitty refers to this 
reinforcement of the classical position saying that “recently………the cases have 
shown a determination to adhere firmly to principles of freedom of contract, 
                                                                                                                                                  
13 See, for example, Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel, ‘Introduction: From ‘Classical’ to 
Modern Contract Law’ in Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel (eds), Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001);  Thomson, J, ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract 
Terms’ in Reid, Kenneth and Zimmermann, Reinhard (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
Vol. 2 (Oxford: University Press, 2000). 
14  Eisenberg, M, ‘Relational Contracts’ in Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel (eds), Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p.296. 
15 See, for example, Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel, ‘Introduction: From ‘Classical’ to 
Modern Contract Law’ in Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel (eds), Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).  
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particularly in commercial contracts between businessmen”16.    
 
The general approaches of English and Scots law to the rules concerning freedom of 
contract and certainty of enforcement are similar.   In relation to Scots law McBryde 
suggests that “(i)f anything, the modern tendency in (Scottish) contract law has been 
to accept English authority if it is relevant.   Thus in any argument about, for 
example, offer and acceptance incorporation of terms in a contract, implied terms or 
repudiation or recission of a contract, English cases will be freely cited.”17. 
 
However Eisenberg is of the opinion that in reality ‘relational’ contracts are more 
common than ‘discrete’ contracts18 and that “the general rules of contract law should 
fit relational contracts, because contracts that involve a relationship between the 
contracting parties, beyond the mere relationship of stranger exchange, comprise the 
bread and butter of contracting”19.  
 
The analysis of judicial decisions and comment will involve a consideration of the 
general rules of law regarding self interest in commercial contracts and their 
application to the express relational content of  partnering agreements.  
Reported cases 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
16 Chitty on Contracts, vol.1, 28th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), p.450, para.7-075. 
17 McBryde, William, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: W Green, 2001), p.10, 
para.1.26. 
18 Eisenberg, op. cit. n.14, p.297. 
19 Ibid. p.298. 
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Judicial consideration of partnering agreements in the UK construction industry is 
currently limited to one reported case in England and no reported cases in Scotland.  
Consequently the precedents in these jurisdictions for how such arrangements will be 
viewed by the courts is very limited.   The Australian construction industry has a 
longer history of co-operative relationships such as partnering and some cases have 
been reported there.   Australian law is historically based on English law and 
therefore some relevant conclusions might be drawn from Australian cases, although 
there are differences in attitude to relational concepts in the two jurisdictions.   
 
In particular Furmston has recognised a movement in Australian law in the direction 
of recognising a relational duty of ‘good faith’ in contracts20 and, more recently, has 
suggested that “(i)t is not inconceivable that on appropriate facts and with skilful 
argument, English law may make tentative steps in the same direction.”21.   Chitty 
does not recognise this advising that “the modern view is that, in keeping with the 
doctrines of freedom of contract and the binding force of contracts, in English 
contract law good faith is in principle irrelevant”22.    
 
 
However McKendrick advises that “(m)any, if not most rules of English contract law, 
conform with the requirements of good faith and cases which are dealt with in other 
systems under the rubric of good faith and fair dealing are analysed and resolved in 
a different way by the English courts, but the outcome is very often the same”23. 
 
                                                     
20 Furmston, Michael P, ‘Performance in Good Faith’ (1998) 9(4) Construction Law 109. 
21 Furmston, Michael P, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed., (London: 
Butterworths, 2001), p.28, para.J. 
22 Chitty on Contracts, 28th ed., Vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), p.13, para.1-019. 
23 McKendrick, Ewan, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle’ in Forte, A D M (ed.), Good Faith in 
Contract and Property (Oxford - Portland Oregon, 1999), p.41. 
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The position is similar in Scots law where MacQueen advises that “good faith does 
play a substantial role in the Scottish law of contract, but that on the whole this has 
been expressed by way of particular rules rather than through broad general 
statements of the principle.”24. 
 
It is submitted, therefore, that although the relevance of Australian decisions and 
comment on partnering agreements requires to be critically analysed in each case, 
especially where specific references to good faith or similar relational concepts may 
have a bearing on the outcome, they will be helpful in analysing potential attitudes in 
English and Scots law.  
 
 Relational concepts expressed in non-binding partnering charters  
 
As previously stated, parties may decide to express a partnering arrangement by 
means of a  traditional standard form construction contract which states the formal 
contractual obligations, supported by a non-binding partnering charter containing the 
commitments to the relational aspects.   This partnering charter is frequently a signed 
document and may be agreed either before or after the execution of the formal 
contract.   In these situations the partnering charter may constitute either a pre-
contractual exchange or an element of conduct subsequent to contract formation.    
 
 
This section examines the possible effects that such partnering charters may have on 
                                                     
24 MacQueen, Hector, ‘Good faith in the Scots Law of Contract’ in Forte, A D M (ed.), Good Faith 
in Contract and Property (Oxford: Portland Oregon, 1999), p.33. 
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the parties’ formal contractual obligations. 
   
In English law written contracts were traditionally subject to the ‘parol evidence rule’ 
which bound the parties to what was written in the contract and excluded the 
presentation of extrinsic evidence of terms which had been agreed, but which had 
been, by accident or design, omitted from the written agreement.25 
 
The rigid application of such a rule could defeat the intentions of the parties where, 
for example, pre-contractual correspondence contains a specific agreement to include 
additional terms in the formal contract documents.   In 1986 the English Law 
Commission decided that, due to extensive exceptions to the rule, it no longer had 
any content and advised that “no parol evidence rule today requires a court to 
exclude or ignore evidence which should be admitted or acted upon if the true 
contractual intention of the parties is to be ascertained and effect given to it”.26 
 
However where it is admitted or proved that the parties intended that the written 
contract should express all the terms of their agreement, then extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible “for the purpose of adding to, varying, subtracting from or 
contradicting the express terms of that contract”.27    
 
Nevertheless pre-contractual exchanges may be relevant to the interpretation of 
contracts in English law as summarised by Lord Steyn: 
                                                     
25 English Law Commission, The Parole Evidence Rule, (Working Paper No 70, 1976) at p.4. 
26 English Law Commission, The Parole Evidence Rule, (Law Com No 154, 1976) at para. 1.7.  
27 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Three Bad Rules in Contract Law, (Scot Law Com No 
152) at para.2.11. 
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“There is a rule that the court is not permitted to use evidence of the pre-
contractual negotiations or their subsequent conduct in aid of the 
construction of written contracts even if the material throws light on the 
subjective intentions of the parties……   But, if these rules were absolute and 
unqualified the primary rule would sometimes defeat the reasonable 
expectations of commercial men.   Pragmatically, it has been decided that if 
pre-contractual exchanges show that the parties attached an agreed meaning 
to ambiguous expressions that may be admitted in aid of interpretation”28. 
 
In 1996 the Scottish Law Commission considered the content of the general rule in 
Scotland that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to prove the existence of 
additional terms beyond those expressed in a written contract document.29   It 
concluded that it was not devoid of content in the way that the equivalent parol 
evidence rule was in England.30   The subsequent Contract (Scotland Act) 1997 
changed the law such that whilst a document appearing to express all the terms of a 
contract is to be presumed to be the whole contract, it is admissible to present 
extrinsic oral or documentary evidence to prove that there are other agreed terms.  
This is the case provided that the contract document itself does not state that it 
represents the whole agreement between the parties.31   
  
                                                                                                                                                  
28 Steyn, J, ‘Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 113 LQR 433 at p.440. 
29 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Three Bad Rules in Contract Law”, (Scot Law Com No 
152, 1996). 
30 Ibid. at para.2.12. 
31 s.1. 
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McBryde’s analysis of the relevance of pre-contractual exchanges to the 
interpretation of ambiguities in contracts in Scotland suggests that the position is 
similar to that in England.32 
 
In both England and Scotland, therefore, whilst evidence of pre-contractual 
exchanges is not excluded in the consideration of written contracts, it is unlikely that 
such exchanges will affect express and unambiguous written terms unless this is 
clearly the intention of the parties.   Since the relational concepts in partnering 
charters are generally expressed in vague and aspirational terms, it is submitted that it 
is unlikely that any true intention to change the express terms of a subsequent written 
contract would be inferred from such a charter agreed during pre-contractual 
exchanges. 
  
In relation to the conduct of the parties subsequent to contract formation in English 
law, Furmston advises that “(w)hat has been created by agreement may be 
extinguished by agreement”.33   However he points to confusion between the 
concepts of agreed variation and waiver and a consequent recourse to equity34.   He 
quotes the equitable doctrine as stated by Bowen LJ as follows: 
 
“(i)f persons who have contractual rights against others induce by 
their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe that 
such rights will not be enforced or will be kept in suspense or 
abeyance for some particular time, those persons will not be allowed 
                                                     
32 McBryde, op. cit. n.17, pp.178-179, paras.8-07 - 8-08. 
33 Furmston, Michael P, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed., (London: 
Butterworths, 2001), p.619. 
34 Ibid. p.625. 
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by a court of equity to enforce the rights until such time has elapsed, 
without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they 
were in before.”35. 
 
Chitty refers to this as waiver by estoppel36 and expresses similar views.37   He 
emphasises that the waiver must be clear and unequivocal.38 
 
In Scots law McBryde also advises that the conduct of the parties subsequent to a 
contract can be relied on for various purposes, one of which is variation of the effect 
of the original contract.39   In this respect he describes personal bar and waiver and 
the difficulties of definition when they are to be inferred from the conduct of the 
parties. He concludes that repeated acceptance of performance different from that 
envisaged in the original contract is one form of conduct which may bar a party from 
insisting on that original performance.40   However it is clear that bar can only apply 
to an existing obligation and not to obligations which have yet to be agreed.41   He 
includes a passage by Bell’s editors which describes personal bar as closely 
corresponding with English estoppel.42  
 
McBryde considers that waiver is a unilateral abandonment of a right for all time 
which again can only apply to a pre-existing contract, obligation or right.43   Since the 
                                                                                                                                                  
35 Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North Western Rly Co (1888)40 ChD 268 at 
286. 
36 Chitty on Contracts, vol.1, 28th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), p.1158, para.23-039. 
37 Ibid. p.1159, para.23-041. 
38 Ibid. p.1160, para.23-043. 
39 McBryde, op. cit. n.17, p.645, para.25-01. 
40 Ibid. p.646, para.25-07. 
41 Ibid. p.647, para.25-06. 
42 Ibid. p.645, para.25-03. 
43 Ibid. p.649, para. 25.12. 
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policy of the law is to encourage the performance of contracts he advises that waiver 
should not be easily inferred.44 
 
In both England and Scotland, therefore, subsequent conduct may alter the effect of a 
contract in similar ways, but clear evidence of intention is again required. 
 
The relevance of a pre-contract partnering charter was considered in the Australian 
case of P Ward v Civil and Civic45.   Civil and Civic had been awarded a BOOT46 
contract for the construction of a water filtration plant and were negotiating a sub-
contract for earthworks with Ward which included a design development aspect.  
During these negotiations the parties had attended a partnering meeting which had 
resulted in the signing of a partnering charter.   In this charter the parties expressly 
agreed that their relationship would be “to work together to achieve our mutually 
developed goals via the collective utilisation of our joint skills in an environment of 
open and honest communication”47.   This charter was signed before the conclusion 
of the formal sub-contract but its legal status does not appear to have been 
specifically defined by the parties. 
 
When the formal sub-contract was eventually prepared it did not contain any 
references to the partnering charter, but it did include a definition of design 
                                                                                                                                                  
44 Ibid. p.649, para.25-16. 
45 [1999] NSWSC 727 (file no.55062/97, 3 August 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/nsw/supreme%5fct/1999/727.html? 
query=title....>(10 October 2001). 
46 BOOT stands for Build,  Own, Operate and Transfer which is a type of construction procurement 
system where the contractor finances the project, operates it for a period to recover the cost and 
then transfers it to the client. 
47 P Ward v Civil and Civic [1999] NSWSC 727 (file no.55062/97, 3 August 1999) (online) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/nsw/supreme%5fct/1999/727.html? 
query=title....>(10 October 2001), para.169. 
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development which Ward subsequently claimed was different from that discussed 
during the negotiations.   Ward had apparently failed to notice this change before the 
sub-contract was signed and they claimed that this placed an additional financial 
liability on them. 
 
A dispute arose over payment for the costs of design carried out by Ward during the 
course of the sub-contract.   Ward claimed that Civil and Civic had represented to 
them that the partnering relationship between them “would be in the nature of a 
partnership and that they would co-operate to ensure that the project was a financial 
success for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant”48 and that in this context Civil and 
Civic’s failure to draw Ward’s attention to the changed liabilities amounted to 
misrepresentation. 
 
However the Judge advised that “(t)he most obvious of the difficulties is the fact that 
Wards seeks to disavow a formal written contract signed by both parties following 
close dealings between them over a period of almost a year, which dealings were, on 
my findings, clearly understood by both parties as intended to culminate in the 
execution of the Subcontract”49. 
 
The Judge dismissed the partnering aspect saying in his conclusion that “Wards’ 
abrogation of the usual common sense commercial obligation to look at contractual 
materials prior to executing a contract, cannot in the circumstances here proven, 
even accepting the ‘partnering’ parameter, sustain this cause of action”50.  
                                                     
48 Ibid. para.25(a). 
49 Ibid. para.386. 
50 Ibid. para.658(6). 
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In regard to taking surrounding circumstances into account in Australian law, the 
Judge confirmed the traditional position on pre-contractual exchanges quoting51 
Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Railway Authority of New South 
Wales52 as follows: 
 
“The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to 
assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or 
susceptible of more than one meaning.   But it is not admissible to contradict 
the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning.”53.  
 
A more extreme situation arose in the only English case involving partnering, Birse 
Construction Ltd v St David Ltd,54 where an initial project was intended to lead to a 
long term relationship.   The case involved building construction by contractor Birse 
for developer St David and was concerned with establishing whether a formal JCT 
form of building contract existed between them for the initial work done over a 
fifteen month period.   During this period various negotiations had taken place in 
relation to contract matters and a pre-contract partnering agreement in the form of a 
charter had been signed.   This charter consisted of general relational statements, eg 
that the parties would enhance their reputations through ‘mutual co-operation and 
trust’, would ‘promote an environment of trust, integrity, honesty and openness’ and 
would ‘build long term profitable relationships with all parties’55.    
                                                     
51 Ibid. para.650. 
52 (1981) 149 CLR 337. 
53 Ibid. at p.352. 
54 (1999) BLR 194, [2000] WL 477292 
55 (1999) BLR 194, at pp.197-198. 
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However, although negotiations to finalise a JCT standard form of contract had been 
proceeding, failure to agree some outstanding matters resulted in a failure to 
formalise the contract.   Disagreements during the initial project meant that the long 
term aspect did not materialise.   Consequently Birse claimed that there was no 
contract and issued a writ for payment on a quantum meruit basis for work done on 
the initial project.   St David sought a stay of proceedings as they claimed that a JCT 
form of contract existed and therefore any dispute over payment must therefore be 
heard by an arbitrator as required by that form of contract.   The arguments were 
therefore about whether the course of dealing had resulted in the formation of a 
contract of the JCT form. 
 
Subsequent to the partnering agreement, Judge Humphrey Lloyd was satisfied that a 
JCT contract had been formed as a result of the course of dealing, together with the 
fact that the parties had never specifically excluded the formation of a contract unless 
and until formal documents were prepared and executed.   In further support of this 
finding the Judge commented that he had “little doubt that the parties considered 
that the “partnering” arrangements that they had made, as exemplified by the 
Charter, made it unnecessary.   People who have agreed to proceed on the basis of 
mutual co-operation and trust, are hardly likely at the same time to adopt a rigid 
attitude as to the formation of a contract”56. 
 
Whilst the Judge rejected any legal status for the partnering charter itself he described 
its significance as follows:   
                                                     
56 Ibid. at p.203. 
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“The terms of that document, though clearly not legally binding, are 
important for they were clearly intended to provide the standards by which 
the parties were to conduct themselves and against which their conduct and 
attitudes were to be measured”57. 
 
This was important in relation to the interpretation of the contract since the Judge was 
of the view that problems would be addressed “within the “partnering” ethos which 
it was expected would have naturally led to a sympathetic approach to the questions 
of extensions of time and of deduction of damages for delay if the plaintiff had not 
been able to maintain the programme because of the occurrence of a relevant event 
(as defined in the JCT Conditions) and also for other reasons beyond its immediate 
control, such as being let down by a supplier or sub-contractor.”58.  
 
Under the JCT form of contract relevant events are occurrences which entitle the 
contractor to extensions of the time for completion of the work and, in some 
instances, financial recompense for loss and expense incurred as a result.   Being let 
down by a supplier or sub-contractor chosen by the contractor is not a relevant event 
under the JCT form of contract and is, therefore, the contractor’s liability.  
Consequently it appears that the Judge considered that the non-legally binding, pre-
contract charter would create a reasonable expectation that the contractor’s liability 
would be reduced in respect of damages for delays for which he should be 
contractually liable.   This represents a transfer of commercial liability from the 
                                                                                                                                                  
57 Ibid. at p.202. 
58 Ibid. 
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contractor to the client.   This would seem to be inconsistent with the concept that a 
partnering charter is merely a surrounding circumstance which is not admissible to 
contradict the language of the contract where this has a plain meaning.   In this case it 
seems that the charter could lead to the plainly expressed risk allocation in the 
contract being waived in advance of the execution of the formal contract. 
 
There are many other circumstances, such as adverse weather, which are also beyond 
a contractor’s ‘immediate control’, but are also not relevant events and are, therefore, 
contractor’s risks under the JCT and many other standard forms of construction 
contract.   Reallocation of the risks of these events to the client would mean that the 
contractor would be entitled to an extension of the time for completion of the work if 
they occurred.   There is no contractual mechanism in the JCT form of contract for 
fixing an extension of time and therefore a revised completion date as a result of 
these circumstances if they are the responsibility of the client.   This in turn means 
that there would be no date from which the client’s entitlement to liquidated damages 
would commence and consequently the right to such damages for any reason would 
be lost.   The whole financial liability of not meeting the original completion date 
would thereby be transferred to the client on the first occurrence of adverse weather. 
 
The Judge also considered that the parties should not be concerned about prejudicing 
their contractual rights in relation to relevant events as a result of non-compliance 
with contractual procedures if there had been true compliance with the spirit of the 
charter.   His reason for this was that “these days one would not expect, where the 
parties had made mutual commitments such as those in the charter, either to be 
concerned about compliance with contractual procedures if otherwise there had been 
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true compliance with the letter or spirit of the charter.   Even though the terms of the 
Charter would not alter or affect the terms of the contract (where they are not 
incorporated or referred to in the contract or are not binding in law in their own 
right) an arbitrator (or court) would undoubtedly take such adherence to the Charter 
into account in exercising the wide discretion to open up, review and revise, etc 
which is given under the JCT Conditions”59.    
 
In this case the Judge considered that other documents excluding the partnering 
charter constituted ‘the contract’.   Since the partnering charter was not incorporated 
into or referred to in the contract, it was not legally binding and would not affect the 
terms of the contract.   However the reference to “these days” suggests that the judge 
was of the view that current attitudes to relationships, in construction at least, had 
developed such that a non-binding agreement such as a partnering charter warranted 
greater significance than merely being a surrounding circumstance.   The parties were 
apparently no longer bound to observe the contractual procedures and the charter 
would ‘undoubtedly’ be taken into account by an arbitrator or a court when using 
their power to review and revise matters concerning extensions of time, etc.   One 
purpose of contract procedures in relation to relevant events to is to allow the client 
to monitor the events and to have adequate access to site records to permit fair 
valuation of them.   The relaxation of the contractor’s obligation to comply with such 
procedures places a greater risk on the client by removing this aspect of control.  
 
In addition this relaxation seems to be a form of advance estoppel or bar against 
implementing subsequently agreed formal contract terms.   It is submitted that this is 
                                                     
59 Ibid. at p.203 
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inconsistent with the general position that an obligation must already exist before it 
can be waived or reliance on it estopped or barred. 
 
It is also relevant that the judge did not restrict the consideration of the charter to 
decisions by an arbitrator whose decision is private and not open to appeal, but 
suggested that a court would also consider it. 
 
Since the Judge found that there was sufficient evidence that a contract on the basis 
of JCT80 terms had been formed, this meant that all disputed matters were required 
to be heard by an arbitrator as required by that form of contract.   A stay of court 
proceedings was therefore granted. 
 
Whilst perhaps not essential to his reasoning in reaching his conclusion that a JCT 
contract had been formed, the Judge’s specific remarks in relation to the relevance of 
the non-binding partnering charter are interesting as judicial observations on the 
possible effect of such an agreement.   However his position does seem inconsistent 
in that whilst on the one hand he affirms that the charter would not alter or affect the 
contract terms, on the other hand he appears to describe how it could do just that. 
 
Birse appealed60 and the appeal Judge came to a different conclusion in relation to the 
existence of a contract.   He reviewed the correspondence and, taking witness 
testimony into account, decided that the course of dealing had not resulted in the 
formation of a contract. 
 
                                                     
60 Birse Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [2000] WL 1421182 (QBD(T&CC), 78 Con LR 121. 
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He found that Birse had acted “consistently with there being no concluded contract 
in place and with their not wishing to take up a contractual (but potentially 
confrontational stance) in advance of knowing that St David was bound to propose 
contract terms”61.   The appeal Judge did not find it necessary to consider the 
relevance of the partnering aspect in reaching his conclusion which relied on other 
documentary evidence and witness testimony.   Also, since there was no contract, 
there was no context in which to comment on the effect of a non-binding partnering 
charter on a contract.   His only comment on the partnering aspect related to Birse’s 
non-confrontational stance where he accepted that “it may also be right to 
say………that Birse acted as it did because that was the appropriate way in which to 
behave………within the partnering arrangement”.62. 
 
The Judge therefore reversed the previous decision and the application to stay 
proceedings was dismissed, thereby allowing Birse to pursue a potential claim for 
quantum meruit through the courts at a future date.  
 
The above cases concerned express relational agreements in the form of pre-contract 
partnering charters where the relational aspects were stated in general aspirational 
terms.   Whilst the cases are very limited in number, the indications in respect of the 
legal content of partnering charters seem to be as follows: 
 
• both the English and Australian cases suggest that a pre-contract partnering 
agreement is likely to be non-binding unless stated otherwise 
                                                     
61 Birse Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [2000] WL 1421182 (QBD(T&CC) (No. 1998 TCC 
No.419) (online) <http://uk.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?.....> (29 April 2002) at p.8 (of 20). 
62 Ibid. 
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• in Australia, whilst a non-binding pre-contract partnering agreement may be used 
as a surrounding circumstance to assist in interpretation of ambiguous terms, it 
will not be admissible to contradict the terms of a formal contract where these 
have a plain meaning;  this is consistent with the general current view on pre-
contractual exchanges in English law and Scots law 
 
• the Australian case suggests that where negotiations are intended to culminate in 
a formal contract, the partnering agreement is not indicative of any deeper 
relationship which might imply a duty to moderate self interest or to protect the 
other party’s interests eg in this case to point out the inclusion of an additional 
obligation;  this is also consistent with the general current view on pre-contractual 
exchanges in English law and Scots law 
 
• in the English case the comments by the first instance judge seem inconsistent in 
themselves in that they confirm that a non-binding, pre-contract partnering 
charter would not alter or affect subsequent formal contract terms and then 
indicate ways in which it would; also his major finding that a JCT contract had 
been formed was reversed by the appeal court which apparently attributed 
negligible significance to the partnering agreement; it is submitted, therefore, that 
whilst  pre-contract partnering charters are currently accorded the traditional 
limited status appropriate to pre-contractual exchanges, any development towards 
greater recognition could release the potential for considerable uncertainty in the 
allocation of liabilities in construction contracts. 
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• bearing in mind the traditional approach to the interpretation of pre-contractual 
partnering charters and the need for clear evidence of intention to infer waiver, 
estoppel or bar, it is submitted that vague and aspirational relational statements in 
post-contract partnering charters are also unlikely to affect express contractual 
requirements. 
 
Relational concepts expressed in binding partnering contracts 
 
The previous cases considered non-binding partnering charters.   In ‘A Guide to 
Project Team Partnering’63 the CIC emphasise that they recommend legally binding 
partnering contracts64 stating that “(f)or the avoidance of doubt what we are talking 
about is a legally binding contract and not a non-legally binding charter or any 
equivalent”65    In the foreword to the guide Egan endorsed the CIC approach saying 
that its advice was squarely behind the recommendations in his report “Rethinking 
Construction”.66 
 
Partnering contracts generally contain express references to relational concepts such 
as co-operation, trust, fairness, mutual disclosure of information, good faith, etc as 
part of the formal obligations.   This section examines the legal interpretation of  
express requirements of this nature in binding partnering contracts. 
                                                     
63 The Construction Industry Council, A Guide to Project Team Partnering (London: CIC, 2000) 
64 The CIC define Project Team Partnering in their glossary of terms as “A structured management 
approach based on a non-adversarial team with a client (and/or users), consultants, constructor, 
key specialists working as a team, operating as a ‘virtual company’, acting co-operatively and 
making corporate decisions, in a blame-free environment of trust and openness”, A Guide to 
Project Team Partnering (London: CIC, 2000), p.25. 
65The Construction Industry Council, A Guide to Project Team Partnering (London: CIC, 2000), 
p.12. 
66 The Report of the construction industry task force chaired by Sir John Egan,  Rethinking 
Construction, (London DETR, 1998). 
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Interpretation of requirements  for ‘good faith’ and disclosure of information in the 
context of a binding partnering contract in Australia were addressed in Thiess 
Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd67.  
                                         
Placer employed Thiess as earthmoving contractors in an opencast mining operation 
under a partnering contract.   This arrangement included an ‘open book’  system for 
costing the mining operations with payments to Thiess being based on these costs 
plus an agreed profit margin.   This system “involved the disclosure by Thiess of 
confidential information concerning the way in which it derived its rates for carrying 
out various mining operations”68.   The contract stated that “the successful operation 
of this Contract requires that (Thiess) and (Placer) agree to act in good faith in all 
matters relating both to the carrying out (of) the works, derivation of rates and 
interpretation of this document”69.   This clause, therefore, placed a specific good 
faith requirement on the derivation of plant rates and general good faith requirements 
on the works and interpretation of the contract as a whole.  
 
A dispute arose over the plant rates whereby Placer alleged that they had not been 
calculated on the agreed costing basis and had been inflated both during the 
negotiations leading up to the execution of the partnering contract and during the 
period of the contract.   Placer subsequently invoked a general termination clause in 
the contract.   Thiess sued claiming that Placer had breached a fiduciary duty by 
terminating the contract.   Placer counterclaimed for damages for the inflated plant 
                                                     
67 [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001). 
68 Ibid. at p.6 (of 247) 
69 Ibid. at p.98 (of 247). 
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rates and claimed that Thiess had owed it fiduciary obligations in respect of both the 
pre-contract negotiations on plant rates leading up to the partnering contract and on 
the subsequent assessment of those rates after execution of the contract.  
 
Paul Finn has defined the ‘good faith’ and ‘fiduciary’ standards of conduct in relation 
to self interest as follows: ‘Good faith’, while permitting a party to act self-
interestedly, nonetheless qualifies this by positively requiring that party, in his 
decision and action, to have regard to the legitimate interests therein of the other.  
The ‘fiduciary’ standard for its part enjoins one party to act in the interests of the 
other – to act selflessly and with undivided loyalty.”70. 
 
Templeton J found that during the pre-contract negotiations the parties were at ‘arms 
length’71 and was not persuaded that the relationship between Thiess and Placer up to 
the point at which they entered into the contract, was a fiduciary one.   He considered 
that at this point if the costing figures were wrong  “then there has been a 
misrepresentation: not a breach of fiduciary duty”72.  
 
However after execution of the partnering contract the Judge gave extensive 
consideration to good faith and fiduciary duties.   He pointed to contract requirements 
stated in general terms “that are typical of many..……which do not define rights and 
obligations with any precision.   Their implementation clearly requires goodwill and 
                                                     
70 MacQueen, Hector, ‘Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract’ in Forte, A D M (ed.),Good Faith 
in Contract and Property (Oxford: Portland Oregon, 1999) p.12 quoting Finn, P D, The Fiduciary 
Principle in Youdan, T G (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver: 
Carswell Co. Ltd, 1989), p.4. 
71 [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001) at p.111 (of 
247). 
72 Ibid. at p.110 (of 247). 
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co-operation on the part of both parties.   ‘‘Good faith’’ must include those 
matters.”73.   Using this basis he went on to interpret the wording and application of 
the good faith clause in detail.  
 
He limited the expression “all matters relating to the works” to meaning all matters 
related to the “carrying out” of the works and he interpreted the good faith obligation 
as “requiring the parties to act honestly with each other and to take reasonable steps 
to co-operate in relation to matters where the contract does not define rights and 
obligations or provide any mechanism for the resolution of disputes”74. 
 
It is submitted that ‘reasonable steps’ in this context would at least imply a duty to 
negotiate in relation to these undefined rights and obligations.   It is also submitted 
that such a duty must also involve the implication of a duty of good faith in relation 
to the negotiation process because, as observed by Einstein J in relation to negotiation 
and mediation processes in the Australian case of Aiton Pty Ltd v Transfield Ltd75, 
“without it there is no chance of reaching a mutually satisfactory conclusion”76.   In 
that case a duty to negotiate and mediate in good faith was expressly stated in the 
contract and was generally considered to be certain and enforceable by the Judge.  
His definition of the content of the express duty of good faith in this situation 
amounted to the display of an appropriate level of pro-active participation in the 
specified negotiation and mediation processes.77 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
73 Ibid. p.98 (of 247). 
74 Ibid. p.99 (of 247). 
75 [2000] ADRLJ 269. 
76 Ibid. at p.365. 
77 Ibid at p.370. 
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However such an approach is precluded in England as a result of Walford v Miles78 
where it was held that “a duty to negotiate in good faith was unworkable in practice 
and inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party, since while the 
parties were in negotiations either of them was entitled to break off the negotiations 
at any time and for any reason”79.   Indeed the good faith duty necessary to regulate 
participation in a negotiating process was described by Lord Ackner as “inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations”80.   
 
This was reinforced in 1994 by the Court of Appeal in Little v Courage Ltd81 where 
Millett L J stated that “(u)nlike some systems of law, English law refuses to 
recognise a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith, and will neither enforce 
such a duty when it is expressly agreed nor imply it when it is not…......”82.    
 
Walford v Miles was also followed in 2000 in Franois Abballe (t/a GFA) v Alstom 
UK Ltd83 where Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC stated that“(t)here is so far as I am 
aware nothing to displace Walford v Miles in which it was held that “a duty to 
negotiate in good faith was unworkable in practice””84. 
 
The judge in Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd85 continued 
his construction of good faith as it applied to the interpretation of the ‘contract 
                                                     
78 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL). 
79 Ibid. at p.129. 
80 Ibid. at p.138. 
81 (1995) 70 P&CR 469. 
82 Ibid. at p.475. 
83 (No1) 2000 WL 331020 (QBD (T&CC)) (No.1999 TCC No.48, 24 March 2000) (online) 
<http://uk.westlaw.com/result/text.wl....>(4 October 2001). 
84 Ibid. at para.23. 
85 [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001). 
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document’ in that case.   He concluded that it required the parties to “construe or 
give effect to general provisions in such a way as to promote the contractual 
objectives, which are to be gleaned either from the contract as a whole or from the 
provisions in particular”86. 
 
However the Judge did not consider that the ‘good faith’ obligation applied to the 
termination provision in the contract.   He cited two apparently independent reasons 
for this.   The first was that the good faith provisions related to the ‘operation’ of the 
contract and ‘termination’ was not concerned with ‘operation’.87   The second was 
that the termination clause was clear and unambiguous and allowed Placer to 
terminate the contract “at its option, at any time and for any reason it may deem 
advisable”88.  
 
In relation to the plant rates issue the Judge went a step further and concluded that the 
contract “imposed on Thiess the obligation of formulating, in good faith, equipment 
operating costs based on historical data.   This was in the nature of a fiduciary 
obligation.”89.   However it was not the good faith requirement which gave rise to the 
fiduciary duty, but the precise nature of the obligation in relation to the formulation 
of plant rates.   This required Thiess to formulate plant rates from “historical data in 
its possession” which “put it in a position in which it was required to act in Placer’s 
interest as well as its own”90.   The Judge therefore considered that Thiess fell within 
the definition of a fiduciary as set out in Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
                                                                                                                                                  
86 Ibid. at pp.99-100 (of 247). 
87 Ibid. at p.100 (of 247). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. at p.246 (of 247), conclusion No.4. 
90 Ibid. at p111 (of 247). 
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Surgical Corporation91 where Mason J stated that “(t)he critical feature of these 
relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in 
the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will 
affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense.   The 
relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special 
opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of the other party 
who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position.”92. 
 
Whilst the Judge in Thiess v Placer defined the extent of the application and 
interpretation of the term ‘good faith’ in various contexts, he advised against 
generalisation saying that “(i)n the end, the term must be construed in the context of 
the agreement in which it appears”93.  
 
The Judge found for the defendants (Placer) and awarded substantial damages in their 
favour.  
 
Thiess appealed94 and the appeal court supported the original judgement in relation to 
the good faith and fiduciary elements, but rejected the basis of the assessment of 
damages.   The lack of a meaningful method of calculating the damages resulted in 
their reduction to a nominal sum. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
91 (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
92 Ibid. at pp.96-97. 
93 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 
990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/ 
WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001) at p.101 (of 247). 
94 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 102 (14 April 2000) 
(online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/ 
1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001). 
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The context of the Thiess case was a partnering contract in which express 
requirements of ‘good faith’ were placed on general conduct and on specific 
obligations, and where certain obligations, by their nature, required, disclosure of 
information.   The conclusions from this case seem to be that: 
 
• the existence of a partnering arrangement is not apparently seen as relevant to the  
interpretation of relational obligations and it is the specific wording of the 
obligations which is important 
 
• in Australian law a general good faith obligation would, as a minimum,  require 
the parties to deal honestly with each other; however there is no suggestion that 
the general requirement for honesty in this context involves any duty of 
disclosure and it is submitted, therefore, that it would be satisfied by the parties 
not being deliberately dishonest;  it is submitted that the attitude of English and 
Scots law to dishonesty would not be significantly different, even in the absence 
of any content of a requirement for good faith in commercial contracts 
 
• in Australian law general statements of good faith may require the parties to take 
reasonable steps to co-operate in relation to matters where the contract does not 
define rights and obligations or provide any mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes;  this suggests the implication of a duty to negotiate in good faith;  such a 
duty would be rejected in English law as a result of Walford v Miles95 and it is 
submitted that this would also be the case in Scotland  
 
                                                     
95 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL). 
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• in Australian law unambiguous rights would not be modified by a general ‘good 
faith’ obligation and it is submitted that this would also be the case in English and 
Scots law 
 
• in Australian law ‘good faith’, expressed either as a general requirement or 
related to a specific obligation is unlikely to give rise to a fiduciary duty;  in order 
to be fiduciary, an obligation in a commercial contract must specifically require 
one party to act in the interests of the other, such as in the duty of honest 
disclosure in this case; the Thiess case suggests that currently even an express 
duty of good faith is irrelevant to a duty of disclosure in commercial situations in 
Australia;  it is submitted that this would also be the case in English and Scots 
law 
 
• the traditional view on pre-contractual exchanges was reinforced; fiduciary duties 
are unlikely to occur during these exchanges because the parties are at ‘arms 
length’;  the expectation that the contract will be a co-operative arrangement such 
as partnering seems to be irrelevant to this;  it is submitted that this would also be 
the case in English and Scots law 
 
• in the final analysis the interpretation of the term ‘good faith’ in Australian law 
depends on the context of the agreement in which it appears 
 
Conclusions 
 
There has been some limited judicial consideration in England and Australia of the 
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effect of pre-contract partnering charters containing relational aspects, in the form of 
statements of mutual co-operative intentions, on formal contractual obligations.   The 
judicial comment suggests that in both jurisdictions these arrangements will not alter 
or affect clear obligations expressed in the formal contract.   No duty to protect the 
other party’s interest appears to arise even where the parties appear to have intended 
that their relationship would be in the nature of a partnership.  
 
The first instance judge in the English case did suggest the potential for a much wider  
interpretation of a pre-contract partnering charter.   This included a significant 
alteration in the balance of risk, especially in relation to extensions of time for 
completion and therefore to the clients entitlement to liquidated damaged for non-
completion.   However, in the light of the appeal court decision, it seems unlikely that 
his views will be followed in the immediate future and consequently it seems likely 
that interpretation will follow the current rules on pre-contractual exchanges and 
conduct subsequent to contract formation. 
 
The general conclusion is, therefore, that no special relational status arises from the 
partnering charter.   Consequently it is merely an element of the pre-contractual 
process and is subject to the current, essentially classical, self interested limits to the 
reference which may be made to it subsequent to contract formation.   With this in 
mind there is no reason to suggest that the relationship where a partnering charter is 
agreed after contract formation would be subject to other than the current narrow 
rules of variation, estoppel, personal bar, waiver, etc in relation to conduct 
subsequent to contract formation.   
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Where a binding partnering contract exists, the partnering relationship again seems to 
be irrelevant to interpretation of the contract.   A significant difference is apparent 
between the Australian and English positions on the relevance of the specific 
relational concept of ‘good faith’.   This might result in enforcement of agreed 
mediation and negotiation processes in Australia but this would not be the case in 
England or Scotland.   However beyond this the interpretation of partnering contracts 
in Australia follows the traditional rules for the construction of contracts.   This again 
results in a traditional construction of pre-contractual exchanges and a reluctance to 
interpret obligations in a manner which suggests any requirement to protect the 
interests of other parties, except where the drafting of the obligation clearly requires 
this.   The situation is likely to be similar in England and Scotland. 
 
Consequently the situation seems to be that currently parties to construction contracts 
can have negligible expectations that any judicial consideration will be given to the 
relationship covered by the term ‘partnering’ in any of its current forms.   The law, as 
it is currently applied, does not fit any positive expectations that the parties may have 
of moderation of self interest as a result of the relational aspects of partnering 
arrangements.   Consequently  parties would be advised to depend on very careful 
drafting of obligations if they expect these to contain any enforceable requirements in 
this regard. 
 
 
